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Chibueze: U.S. Objection to the ICC

UNITED STATES OBJECTION TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
A PARADOX OF
"OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM"

REMIGIUS CHIBUEZE*

I.

INTRODUCTION

One of the most historic events of the last century was the establishment
of a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) after almost five
decades of failed efforts. I About 160 countries and a wide representation
of nongovernmental organizations converged at the UN Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries (held in Rome, Italy, from June 15 to
July 17, 1998) to finalize and adopt a statute to establish an international
criminal court. 2 At the end of the conference, on July 17, 1998 members

* Attorney-at-Law, San Francisco; Solicitor & Advocate of the Supreme Court of Nigeria;
SJ.D. Candidate, LL.M. (expected May 2003) Intellectual Property Law, Golden Gate University
School of Law, San Francisco; LL.M., University of Alberta, Canada; LL.B (Hons.), University of
Benin, Nigeria.
This Paper was initially presented at the Twelfth Annual Fulbright Symposium and the
Eleventh Regional Meeting of the American Society of International Law on Thursday, March 28.
2002 at Golden Gate University School of Law. San Francisco.
I.
See CHERIF BASSIOUNI. THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 3 (1998). where he noted that "since the end of World War I (1919). the
world community has sought to establish a permanent international criminal court."
2.
For a complete list of states and organizations represented at the Conference. see Final Act
of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Coun, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. NCONF.183/1O, Annex II, ill (1998)
[hereinafter Diplomatic Conference].
19
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of the diplomatic conference voted 120 to 7 in favor of adopting the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute).3
There has been tremendous success in the signing and ratification of the
ICC Statute. To date, 139 countries have signed and 89 countries,
encompassing countries from all regions of the globe, have ratified the
statute,4 which took effect on July 1, 2002 after being ratified by more
than 66 countries. 5 This remarkable support for the ICC demonstrates
the direction of a new world order and the recognition that international
justice and the fight against impunity require the cooperation and
consensus of nations.
The Court will exercise complementary jurisdiction with national courts
over individuals accused of committing egregious international crimes of
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 6 The ICC is a
permanent adjudicatory institution for the crimes contained in the
Genocide and the four Geneva Conventions, and related international
instruments as particularized in the ICC Statute. 7 The Court's
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is suspended until an acceptable
definition is agreed upon by member states. s Terrorism and drug-related
crimes were adopted into the text in an annexed resolution and will
become part of the crimes under the Court's jurisdiction once it is
defined at a review conference in the future.

3.
The Rome Statute o/the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. AlCONF. 183/9 (July 17,
1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter ICC Statute).
4.
The countries that have ratified the Statute are: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Antigua &

Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, BosniaHerzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Central African Republic, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica,
Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Honduras,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malawi, Mali,
Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Mongolia, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger,
Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Timor-Leste, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and
Zambia.
See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, available at
http://untreaty.un.orglEnglishlbiblel englishinternetbiblelpartIlchapterXVIIIItreatylO.asp (visited
Feb. 18,2003) [hereinafter Multilateral Treaties).
5.
ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 126, provides that the Statute shall come into force when
ratified by 60 countries.
6.
Id., art. I.
7.
Id., art. 5(1).
8.
Id., art. 5(2).
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The ICC is built upon the principles enunciated in the Nuremberg,9
Yugoslavia,1O and Rwandan ad hoc tribunals. 11 The ICC is not expected
to bring an automatic end to these abominable crimes, but will offer a
permanent forum to prosecute those accused of gross international
crimes when national systems are unable or unwilling to prosecute.
Therefore, the ICC as a permanent institution will serve as a constant
remainder to violators of international crimes that they will be held
accountable for their actions. 12
While most countries declared their support for the ICC, the U.S. was not
in favor of signing the statute and therefore voted against it, along with
six other states, including China, Iran, Iraq, Israel, and Libya. 13
However, in his last days in office, former President Bill Clinton
authorized U.S. signature on December 31, 2000 in order to reaffirm
U.S. "strong support for international accountability and for bringing to
justice perpetrators of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity." 14
This reaffIrmation of strong support for international accountability was,
however, not backed with a commitment to ratify the statute. The former
president indicated that his administration had no intention of submitting
Notwithstanding the
the statute to the Senate for ratifIcation. IS
President's assurance that he would not seek senate ratifIcation, Senator
Jesse Helms (R-NC), who was the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Chairman at that time, was reported to have informed then Secretary of

9.
See Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War
Criminals (Nuremberg, September 30 - October 1, 1946),41 AM. 1. INT'L L. 172 (1947) [hereinafter
Nuremberg Judgment].
10.
See The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 3217 th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 321.L.M. 1192 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. The
ICTY Statute was unanimously adopted by the Security Council at its 3217 th meeting, May 25,1993,
for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. See also S.c. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48 th Sess.,
3217 th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/827(l993), reprinted in 32 LL.M. 1203 (1993).
11.
See Security Council Resolution Establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453,d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted
in 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1194) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. The ICTR was set up to prosecute those
responsible for the genocidal war in Rwanda.
12.
David J. Scheffer, Staying the Course with the International Criminal Coun, 35 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 47, 51-52 (2002).
13.
Ruth Wedgwood, Harold K. Jacobson & Monroe Leigh, The United States and the Statute
of Rome, 95 AM. J.INT'L L. 124 (2001). See also, Diplomatic Conference, supra note 2.
14.
William Jefferson Clinton, Statement on the Signature of the International Criminal Court
Treaty, Washington, D.C. 1 (Dec. 31, 2000), at http://www.state.gov/www/globaU
swcilOO1231_c1inton_icc.html (visited Apr. 10,2002).
15.
Id.
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State Madeline Albright that the ICC treaty "will be dead on arrival."16
He boasted that "if I do nothing else this year, I will make certain that
President Clinton's outrageous and unconscionable decision to sign the
Rome Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court is reversed
and repealed."I?
The U.S. position has not changed under the current administration of
President George W. Bush who has indicated an even stronger
unwillingness to cooperate with the ICC. The Bush administration
carried out a policy review of the International Criminal Court, and on
May 6, 2002, the administration took the controversial step of nullifying
the United States' signature to the ICC Statute: s Also, on August 5,
2002, President Bush signed into law the American Service-members'
Protection Act (ASPA):9
ASPA forbids the government from
cooperating with the Court and authorizes "any necessary action"
including the use of force to free any American soldiers who may be held
in custody by the Court.20 The ASP A is now referred to in international
circles as the "Hague Invasion Act" because of the possibility of the use
of force against the Court. 21
United States opposition to the ICC raises many questions, as it
contradicts the U.S. record as a leading participant in the Nuremberg
trials of accused war criminals following World War II; as a key
supporter of the tribunals trying those that committed genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity in Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia; and as an early proponent of creating a permanent court. 22 It
should be recalled that on March 25, 1998, when President Bill Clinton
visited genocide survivors in Rwanda, he explained that the problems of
ad hoc tribunals demonstrated the need for a permanent international

16.
Senator Jesse Helms, Towards a Compassionate Conservative Foreign Policy, Address to
the American Enterprise Institute 10 (Jan. 11, 2001) at http.llwww.senate.gov/-foreignl
2000/proOI1201.htm.

17.
[d.
18.
Also, on August 28, 2002 Israel informed the U.N. Secretary-General that it has no legal
obligations arising from its signature of the Rome Statute on December 31, 2000. See Multilateral
Treaties, supra note 4.
19.
See Richard Dicker, Hague Invasion Act' Becomes Law - White House Stops at Nothing in
Campaign Against War Crimes Court, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH - HUMAN RIGHTS NEWS (Aug. 3,
2002) available at http://www.hrw.org/pressl2oo2l08/aspa080302.htm.
20.
Id.
21.
Id.
22.
Lynn Sellers Bickley, U.S. Resistance to the International Criminal Court: Is the Sword
Mightier Than the Law?, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 213, 239-240 (2000); Roseann M. Latore, Escape
Out the Back Door or Charge in the Front Door: U.S. Reactions to the International Criminal
Court, 25 B.c. INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 159, 160 (2002).
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court to deal with crimes like the Rwandan genocide. 23 He, therefore,
pledged that "the United States will work to see that it is created." 24
The Bush administration's hostility to the ICC contrasts sharply with its
efforts to create a coalition to combat terrorism in the wake of the
September 11, 2001 attacks. As a build up for the war, "Operation
Enduring Freedom," President Bush divided the world into two; those
with America and the countries opposing it. 25 It is ironic that while those
countries the U.S. abandoned at the Rome Conference are in coalition
with the Bush administration to fight impunity (the very reason they
support the ICC Statute), some of the countries that voted with the U.S.
against the ICC Statute are today on the other side of "Operation
Enduring Freedom."
The coming together of allies to support the U.S. in pursuit of "Operation
Enduring Freedom" is another indication that this is not the kind of
action that the ICC was meant to undermine. In a White House
memorial marking six months since the September 11 terrorist attacks,
President George W. Bush acknowledged the efforts of these nations that
deployed forces or provided logistics and other supports for "Operation
Enduring Freedom" and declared that the United States could not have
done its work without support from these countries. 26 However, his
administration has not deemed it necessary to cooperate with the same
countries that support the U.S.'s "Operation Enduring Freedom" by
building support for the ICC towards creating a permanent institution of
justice to punish the likes of the perpetrators of the September 11 attack.
There is no doubt that the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United
States were crimes against humanity as contained in the Rome Statute?7
Therefore, if the ICC had existed on that date, it would have had
jurisdiction to punish those responsible for the terrorist assaults on the
23.
Remarks of President Clinton to Genocide Survivors, Assistance Workers, and U.S. and
Rwandan Government Officials (Mar. 28, 1998) (transcripts available at Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights - The Case for U.S. Support, http://www.lchr.org/featurel50th/uspos.htm) (visited
Mar. 6, 2002).
24.
[d.
25.
President' George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American
People (Sept 20, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2001l09/20010920-8.htrnl). See also, President George W. Bush, No Nation Can be Neutral
in this Conflict, Remarks by the President to the Warsaw Conference on Combating Terrorism (Nov.
06, 2001) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001l11/20011I062.html).
26.
President George W. Bush, President Thanks World Coalition for Anti-Terrorism Efforts,
Remarks by the President on the Six-Month Anniversary of the September II th Attacks (Mar. II,
2002) (transcript available at http://www. whitehouse.gov/news/releasesI2002/03120020311-I.htrnl).
27.
ICC Statute, supra note 3, art 6.
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United States. 28 Paradoxically, while the United States is leading the rest
of the world in the war against terrorism after the wake of September .11,
2001,29 it is also leading and instigating opposition to frustrate the
effective operation of the ICC. 30
This inconsistent position taken by the United States is the thesis of this
paper. Part II of the paper summarizes the background and scope of the
ICC. In part III, the paper discusses U.S. grounds for opposing the ICC
and argues that those grounds offer no valid reason for the United States
refusal to join the international community effort to establish a
permanent criminal court to ensure that those who commit the crimes of
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes are held accountable
for their actions. Part IV examines specific steps taken by the United
States to undermine the court, and evaluates the effect of U.S. opposition
to the ICC. Part V concludes inter alia, that U.S. desire for a unipolar
superpower regime will adversely affect United States interest in the long
run, even if it provides any short term benefits.
II.

BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT

A.

BACKGROUND TO THE CREAnON OF THE ICC

As Dr. Koffi Annan UN Secretary-General observed:
For nearly half a Century ... almost as long as the United
Nations has been in existence ... the General Assembly has
recognized the need to establish such a court to prosecute and
punish persons responsible for crimes such as genocide. Many
thought ... that the horrors of the Second World War... the
camps, the cruelty, the exterminations, the Holocaust ... could
never happen again. And yet they have. In Cambodia, in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, in Rwanda. Our time ... this decade even ...
has shown us that man's capacity for evil knows no limits.
Genocide ... is now a word of our time, too, a heinous reality
that calls for a historic response. 3 )

28.

Scheffer, supra note 12, at 49.

29.

[d. at 54.

30. See discussions infra Part IV.
International Criminal Court Overview, at
31. Rome
Statute of the
http://www.un.orgllaw/icdgeneraVoverview.htm (visited Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter ICC
Overview].
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Commentators trace the history of an international criminal court to the
early nineteenth century. In 1872, Gustav Moynier, one of the founders
of the International Committee of the Red Cross, proposed a permanent
court in response to the crimes of the Franco-Prussian War. 32 There was
little effort in this regard until the events of World War II and its
aftermath reminded the international community that a permanent
criminal court is a requirement of our society. After the Nuremberg
Judgment of 1946 there was renewed interest which resulted in the
establishment of an International Law Commission (ILC).33 Through
resolution 260 of December 9, 1948, the UN General Assembly invited
the ILC "to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an
international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with
genocide."34
After preliminary findings, the Commission came to the conclusion that
the establishment of an international court to try persons charged with
genocide or similar crimes was both desirable and possible. The UN
General Assembly established a committee to prepare proposals relating
to the establishment of such a court. The committee prepared a draft
statute in 1951 which was revised in 1953. The General Assembly
decided to postpone consideration of the draft statute ostensibly pending
the adoption of a definition of aggression. However, it was understood
that the then-prevailing Cold War stymied efforts at moving ahead with
such a project.
In 1989, the UN General Assembly was once again called to reconsider
the issue of a permanent court following the request of Trinidad and
Tobago for an international court with jurisdiction to try international
drug traffickers. In response to that request, the General Assembly
mandated the ILC to recommence its work on the proposed Court with
jurisdiction to include drug trafficking. 35
Meanwhile, gross acts of ethnic cleansing were taking place in the
former Republic of Yugoslavia, while genocidal war continued unabated
in Rwanda. These developments shocked the conscience of the
international community and jolted them into action. Thus, in an effort
to bring an end to widespread disregard of the laws of war which leads to
unprecedented war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, the
32.
Beth K. Lamont, The International Criminal Court, 58 HUMANIST (1998) available at
www.corliss-1arnont.orglhsrnny/icc.htm (last revised Jan. 22, 2003).
33.
G.A Res. 260 (ill), U.N. Doc. N81O, at 174 (1948).

34.

Id.

Jelena Pejic, Creating a Permanent International Criminal Coun: The Obstacles to
Independence and Effectiveness, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 297 (1998).
35.
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UN Security Council established an ad hoc International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 1993 and for Rwanda in 1994, to
hold individuals accountable for those atrocities and to deter similar
crimes in the future. 36
On the other hand, the inability of the United Nations to create additional
ad hoc tribunals to adjudicate international crimes committed in
Cambodia during the Pol Pot regime of 1975-79,37 during the factional
and guerilla warfare for the ouster and replacement of Samuel Doe in
Sierra Leone from 1996 to the present,38 and in East Timor in 199939
suggests that ad hoc tribunals may not always be available when
needed.40
These developments engendered a state of urgency for the n..C,
considering that the twentieth century has been the bloodiest in human
history. The conflicts that took place in the last decade which are
primarily internal, demonstrated tragically that there was a continuing
need to take measures to put an end to abominable crimes.41 Thus, in
1994 the n..C presented a draft statute on an international criminal court
(ICC) to the UN General Assembly.42 The General Assembly then set
up an Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International

36.
ICTY Statute, supra note 10. Also see, ICTR Statute, supra note 11.
37. See G.A. Res. 521135, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. N521644/Add.2 (1997),
available at http://www.un.orglgaldocumentslgares521res52135.htm. The resolution requested the
UN Secretary General and the Cambodian government work together in order to address past serious
violations of Cambodian and international law. See also Report of the Group of Experts for
Cambodia Established Pursuant to G.A. Res. 521135, U.N. Doc. Al53/400 (1998), available at
hnp://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/cambodia-I999.html (Feb. 18, 1999). The Report recommended
that members of the Pol Pot regime could be held criminally responsible through domestic trials, a
tribunal under Cambodian law, a United Nations tribunal, and a Cambodian tribunal under United
Nations administration.
38.
See S.c. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55 th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. SlRES/1315 (2000). The
Resolution requested the UN Secretary General to issue a report concerning the establishment of a
special court in order to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes in Sierra Leone. See also
Report of the UN Secretary General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N.
Doc. S/2000/915, at 13 (2000) providing the legal framework and requisite administrative elements
for the creation of a Sierra Leonean special court. Also see Res. 1370, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., at 3,
U.N. Doc. SlRES/1370 (2001). The Resolution encourages the UN Secretary General, the
government of Sierra Leone and others involved "to expedite the establishment of ... the Special
Court envisaged by resolution 1315 (2000) of 14 August 2000."
39. See U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor, Reg. 2000115, at 1, U.N. Doc.
UNTAETIREGI2000/15 (2000) available at http://www.un.orglpeaceletimor/untaetRIRegOOI5E.pdf
establishing a special panel of judges to address serious criminal offences committed in East Timor.
40.
Various reasons were offered for the failure - financial burden to lack of cooperation from
successive governments in these countries.
41.
Phillippe Kirsch, Q.C., The International Criminal coun: Current Issues and Perspectives,
64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3,4 (2001).
42.
Pejic, supra note 35, at 298.
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Criminal Court to consider major substantive issues arising from the ILC
draft. 43
After the Ad Hoc Committee's report, the General Assembly set up a
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court (PreCom) to prepare a consolidated draft text for submission to a
diplomatic conference. PreCom organized several meetings from 1996
to 1998 which were attended by governments, international law experts,
and non-governmental organizations (NOOs). In its final session, held in
March and April of 1998, the Committee completed the drafting of the
ICC text.
Since Italy had in 1996 offered to host an ICC Conference, the General
Assembly, at its fifty-second session decided to convene the United
Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court in Rome, Italy, from June 15 to July
17 1998, "to finalize and adopt a convention on the establishment of an
international criminal court." In his opening speech to the Conference,
the UN Secretary General, Dr. Kofi Annan, noted as follows:
In the prospect of an international criminal court lies the promise
of universal justice. That is the simple and soaring hope of this
vision. We are close to its realization. We will do our part to
see it through till the end. We ask you ... to do yours in our
struggle to ensure that no ruler, no State, no junta and no army
anywhere can abuse human rights with impunity. Only then will
the innocents of distant wars and conflicts know that they, too,
may sleep under the cover of justice; that they, too, have rights,
and that those who violate those rights will be punished. 44

Unlike the previous ad hoc tribunals -- Nuremberg, Yugoslavia and
Rwanda -- the groundwork for the ICC Statute was done by the UN
General Assembly and the International Law Commission rather than
individual states. Their aim was to develop a code of offenses and to
elaborate a statute for an independent international criminal jurisdiction. 45
Although the U.S. signed the statute at the last opportunity on December
31, 2000, the United States' vote against the adoption of the statute
leaves a sour taste.

43.

[d.

44. ICC Overview, supra note 31.
45. Jonathan Stanley, Focus: International Criminal Court: A Court that Knows No
Boundaries?: The International Criminal Court Treaty is a Big Achievement but Can it Deliver
what it Promises?, THE LAWYER, Aug. 11, 1998, available at 1998 WL 9167987.
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Genocide
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Article 6 of the Rome Statute provides that an accused shall be gUilty of
the crime of genocide as defined in the Statute if committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
groups. The definition corresponds to the pertinent provisions of the
Geneva Conventions of 1948. It has been argued that the crimes of
former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet would not meet the ICC
Statute's definition of Genocide because he allegedly targeted
individuals due to their politics rather than their race or religion. 46 For
this reason, the Rome Conference should have considered the need to
expand the definition of Genocide beyond that of the 1948 Geneva
Convention to include acts of genocide directed against members of an
opposing political group and social groupS.47
2.

Crimes against Humanity

For an act to be considered as a crime against humanity, Article 7 of the
Rome Statute states that it must have been committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population,
with knowledge of the attack. Article 7(2)(a) defines "attack directed
against any civilian population" as applied in Article 7(1) to mean a
course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to
in paragraph one pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational
policy to commit such attack.
3.

War Crimes

Article 8 provides that the Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war
crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part
of a large-scale commission of such crimes. 48 With pressure from the
U.S. and other permanent members of the Security Council, the
Conference approved Article 124 under the Transitional Provision,
which allows ratifying states to declare that they "opt out" of the Court's
jurisdiction for war crimes committed by its nationals or on its territory
for a non renewable period of seven years. 49

46.

Diane F. Orentlicher, Putting Limits on Lawlessness: From Nuremberg to Pinochet,

WASH. POST, Oct. 25,1998, at Cl.

47.
48.
49.

Id.
ICC Statute, supra note 3, art 8.
Id., art 124.
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TRIGGERING THE COURT'S JURISDICTION

Article 12 provides that the court has jurisdiction to prosecute individuals
suspected of committing any of the crimes contained in the Rome Statute
when the crimes have been committed in the territory of state which has
ratified the Rome Statute or when the crimes have been committed by a
citizen of a state which has ratified the Rome Statute. Further, the Court
may exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed in the territory of a nonparty state or crimes committed by a citizen of a non-party states if the
state which has not ratified the Rome Statute makes a declaration
accepting the court jurisdiction over the crime. The court may also
exercise jurisdiction when the crimes have been committed in a situation
which threatens or breaches international peace and security, and the UN
Security Council has referred the situation to the Court pursuant to
Chapter 7 of the UN Chapter.
Article 13 provides three mechanisms to trigger the Court's exercise of
jurisdiction for the crimes listed in Articles 6 to 8 of the Statute.
1.

Referral by a State

Under Article 13(a), a State party to the Court may refer a situation to the
prosecutor in which one or more of the crimes covered by the statute
appears to have been committed. The prosecutor is obliged to investigate
such referrals for the purpose of determining whether one or more
specific persons should be charged with the commission of such crimes. 50
Under Article 12(3) a non party State in whose territory a crime subject
to the jurisdiction of the court occurred, or of which the accused person
is a national may, by declaration lodged with the registrar, accept the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in
question. Thus, it follows that such a non party state may refer on ad hoc
basis, a case to the prosecutor who shall in tum treat the referral in
accordance with Article 14.
2.

Initiation by the Independent Prosecutor

Article 15 allows the Court's Independent Prosecutor to initiate
investigations proprio motu based on information from victims, nongovernmental organizations, or any other source.
Despite the
controversy surrounding this provision occasioned by the United States'
objection, its advantage cannot be overemphasized because one cannot
50.

[d., art 13(a).
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always rely on national governments and the Security Council to bring
matters to the Court.
In any event, the prosecutor's exercise of discretion is subject to the

approval of the pretrial judges who determine whether there is a
reasonable basis for the investigation.51 If the pre-trial judges are of the
view that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with the investigation,
and that the case appears within the jurisdiction of the Court, it shall
authorize the prosecutor to proceed with investigation. On the other
hand, if the pretrial judges are of the opinion that there is no sufficient
basis to proceed with investigation, they shall decline authorization. The
Prosecutor may subsequently represent the case based on new facts or
evidence regarding the same situation. 52
Article 16 of the Rome Statute allows the Security Council by resolution
to stop a prosecution initiated by a state party, or stop the prosecutor
from going forward, for an initial period of twelve months if in the
opinion of the Security Council the prosecution will interfere with the
Council's efforts to maintain international peace and security under
Article VII of the UN Charter. The Security Council can renew its
request indefinitely, In twelve month segments, under the same
conditions.
3.

Referral by the Security Council

In a situation in which one or more of the crimes covered under the ICC

Statute appears to have been committed, the Security Council, acting
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, may refer such matter to the
prosecutor. Since the Security Council is exercising its power under
Article VII of the UN Charter, it has been suggested that the ICC, acting
under Security Council's direction, shall have jurisdiction over nationals
of State parties and non-state parties without their consent. In other
words, the UN Security Council may confer jurisdiction on the Court
even when the alleged crimes occurred in the territory of a state which
has not ratified the Rome Statute or the crime was committed by the
national of such a state. Also, when the Security Council refers a matter
to the ICC, it is expected that it will avail the court with its enforcement
mechanism should a state fail to cooperate with the court.53

51.
52.

53.

/d., art. 15(2).
[d., art. 15(5).
Pejic, supra note 35, at 325.
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ill. GROUNDS OF UNITED STATES' OBJECTIONS TO THE ICC
A.

ICC JURISDICTION OVER NON-PARTIES

The main objection of the United States to the ICC Statute is based on a
compromised Article 12 which set out the "preconditions" for the
Court's jurisdiction in cases where the Security Council does not trigger
the Court's jurisdiction. Absent submission of a case to the ICC by the
UN Security Council, the Court can act only if the case occurs in the
territory of a state party, or if the crime is committed by a citizen of a
state party.
Thus, the Court may only exercise jurisdiction over a citizen of a nonparty state if he or she commits a crime in the territory of a state party
and the state party elects to surrender the accused to the jurisdiction of
the Court rather than trying him or her in its national court. For this to
occur, the accused must remain in the territory of a state party or be
otherwise lawfully apprehended by the state party. This provision
sharply limits the Court's jurisdiction absent Security Council initiative,
as rogue nations will be the last to ratify the statute in order to shield
them from the reach of the Court.
Throughout the Conference, the U.S. sought to limit the Court's
jurisdiction by arguing that the Court should exercise jurisdiction only
against citizens of member states or territorial states on claims of official
acts. The United States wanted a situation in which no U.S. citizen would
ever be brought before the ICC without U.S. consent. 54 It demanded a
guarantee that no U.S. servicemen or women would be investigated or
prosecuted by the ICC without U.S. consent. 55
It has been suggested that the justification for the U.S. position was that
"more than any other country the United States is expected to intervene
to halt humanitarian catastrophes around the world."56 It was therefore
argued that this position renders U.S. personnel "uniquely vulnerable to
the potential jurisdiction of an international criminal court."57 The U.S.
position was not acceptable to most countries at the Conference who

54.
Wedgwood et aI .• supra note 13. at 126.
55. Id.
56. Michael P. Scharf. Rome Diplomatic Conference for an International Criminal Coun.
ASIL INSIGHTS (June 1998). available at http://asil.orglinsightslinsigh20.htm (accessed Mar. 15.
2002).
57. Id.
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voted to adopt Article 12.58 However in order to accommodate some of
the concerns of the U.S., the states rejected the proposal by Korea that
the Court should also exercise jurisdiction if the victim's state or the
custodial state has ratified the statute. 59
It should be noted that in most cases, the state of nationality and the

territorial state are likely to be the same, as occurred with Pol Pot of
Cambodia, Idi Amin of Uganda, Pinochet of Chile. 60 The inclusion of
the custodial state would have made it possible to apprehend an accused
while traveling outside his or her country, or in the alternative, make it
difficult for the accused to travel outside his or her country, thereby
denying a safe haven anywhere. But, given the way Article 12 was
drafted, a country in whose territory an accused is residing will have no
legal basis under the statute to surrender the accused to the Court. This
is because Article 12 only requires a state party to submit to the Court's
jurisdiction if the crime was committed on its territory, or the person
accused of the crime is a national. 61 In other words, a situation in which
a person commits a crime in state A and then enters state B, state B is not
obliged to surrender him or her to the Court because the crime was not
committed in state B's territory and the accused is not a national of state
B.

Article 12 also makes it impossible for the victim's state to initiate a case
to the ICC if its citizens were victims of international crimes in the
territory of another state or by nationals of a non-state party. It has been
suggested that if victim's state is allowed to submit a case to the Court,
the Spanish government would have been in a position to petition the
ICC (if it were then in existence) for the "disappearance" of some
Spaniards in Argentina in the 1970s and 80S. 62
Notwithstanding the compromise to limit the court's jurisdiction only to
situations in which the crime was committed in the territory of a state
party or by a national of a state party, the U.S. representatives claimed
that ICC jurisdiction overreaches, and violates fundamental principles of
international law because it binds non-state parties. 63 The U.S. argued
that under customary international law, a treaty-based international court
58.
Human Rights Watch, Text Analysis International Criminal Court Treaty, July 17, 1998
available at http://www.hrw.org/press98/july/icc-anly.htm (last modified Apr. 4, 2(02) [hereinafter
ICC Treaty Text Analysis].
59. /d.
60.
/d.
61.
ICC Statute, supra note 3, arts. 12(2)(a-b).
62.
ICC Treaty Text Analysis, supra note 58.
63. David Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AlII.. 12, 18
(1999).
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cannot exercise jurisdiction over the nationals of a non-party state when
acting under the direction of such a non-party state. 64
According to Ambassador David Scheffer:
The illogical consequence imposed by Article 12, particularly for
non-parties to the treaty, will be to limit severely those lawful,
but highly controversial and inherently risky, interventions that
the advocates of human rights and world peace so desperately
seek from the United States and other military powers. There
will be significant new legal and political risks in such
interventions .... 65
Another commentator has suggested that, by conferring upon the ICC
jurisdiction over non-party nationals, the ICC Statute would abrogate the
pre-existing rights of non-parties which, in tum, would violate the law of
treaties. 66 This commentator suggested that a state has a right to be free
from the exercise of exorbitant jurisdiction over its nationals which
cannot be abrogated by a treaty to which it is not a party.67 Cited in
support were the ILC official Commentaries on the Vienna Convention
to the effect that "[i]ntemational tribunals have been firm in laying down
that in principle treaties, whether bilateral or multilateral, neither impose
obligations on States which are not parties nor modify in any way their
legal rights without their consent."68 Furthermore, it was argued that
because of the gravity of the outcome, member states cannot delegate to
the ICC their territorial or universal jurisdiction.69
Those who make the argument that the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction
over individuals if his or her state has not ratified the statute confuse
and/or equate the position of a non-party state with that of its nationals.
As would be expected, this argument has been rejected by international
law commentators on the simple basis that while a non-party state is not
itself obligated under a treaty to which it has not consented, the same
cannot be said of its nationals if they commit an offense in the territory
of a state that is a party. 70 Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties provides that "a treaty does not create either obligations
64.

Id.

65.
Id. at 19. Ambassador Scheffer has since abandoned this position. See Scheffer, supra
note 12, at 60.
66. Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 26 (2001).
67. Id. at 27.
68.
Id.
69.
Id.
70.
Wedgwood et aI., supra note 13, at 127.
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or rights for a third state without its consent."7) Also, Article 35 states
that a treaty cannot establish an obligation on a non-party state unless it
"expressly accepts that obligation in writing."72
No provision of the Rome Statute expressly created obligations to nonparty states. It cannot therefore be argued that the Court's exercise of
treaty-based jurisdiction over the nationals of non-party state for
international crimes contravenes this rule of international law. 73
Therefore, the argument that the statute is "overreaching" because it
purportedly obligates non-party states through the exercise of jurisdiction
over their nationals is a gross distortion of customary internationallaw. 74
In addition, the U.S. is a party to many treaties that are globally binding
on nationals of party and non-party states because they reflect the
common interests of humanity.75 Similarly, U.S. legislative practice
recognizes that the first and best established jurisdictional principle is
"territoriality." Territoriality is considered the normal, and nationality
the exceptional, basis for the exercise of jurisdiction.76 Also, U.S.
legislative practice recognizes that a state may exercise universal
jurisdiction to define and punish certain offenses of universal concern
which are recognized by the community of nations, such as piracy, the
slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of an aircraft, genocide, war crimes,

71.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 34, U.N. Doc.
NCONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 543 (1969).
72.
ld., art. 35.
73.
Michael P. Scharf, Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of
Non-Party States, 35 NEW ENG. L.R. 363, 376 (2001).
74.
See Human rights Watch, The ICC Jurisdictional Regime; Addressing U.S. Arguments,
available at http://www.hrw.orglhrw/campaigns/icc/docs/icc-regime.htm (last modified Apr. 4,
2(02).
75.
See Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, done
Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
done Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641 ("Hague Convention"); Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done Sept. 23, 1971,24 U.S.T. 565 ("Montreal
Convention"); The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, done Dec. 17, 1979,
1979 V.S.T. LEXIS 186; The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, adopted Dec. 14, 1973,28 U.S.T.
1975 ("Protected Persons Convention"); The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 1988 U.S.T. LEXIS 202 (''Torture
Convention"); The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, opened for signature Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 V.N.T.S. 243 ("Apartheid Convention"); The
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material done Oct. 26, 1979, 1979 U.S.T. LIDOS
187. These treaties provide for and obligate states, both states of nationality and territorial states, to
exercise jurisdiction or extradite. Furthermore, the Montreal Convention, the International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, the Protected Persons Convention, the Torture
Convention and the Apartheid Convention allow for the victim's state to either exercise jurisdiction
or extradite. The U.S. is a member of all except the Apartheid Convention.
76.
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations of the United States, § 402 cmt. (American Law
Institute, 1987).
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and perhaps terrorism, even where none of the bases of jurisdiction
indicated in section 402 are present. 77
United States courts have given judicial support to these statutory
provisions, recognizing national courts' power to exercise jurisdiction in
circumstances identical to those set forth in the provisions of Article 12
of the ICC Statute. 78 Therefore, it is preposterous for the U.S. to argue

77.
[d. 'll 404.
78.
See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980) the U.S. Supreme Court
recognized that instruments not binding upon states as a treaty, "create an expectation of adherence,
and insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State practice ... may by custom become
recognized as laying down rules binding upon states"; Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36
I.L.R. 50 (Israel S.C!. 1962) where the Israeli Supreme Court found that there was "full justification
for applying here the principle of universal jurisdiction since the international character of "crimes
against humanity" ... dealt with in this instant case is no longer in doubt ... " acts alleged happened
before the existence of the state of Israel; In re Demjanjuk, 612 F.Supp. 544 (N.D. Ohio 1985), affd,
776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985) the court allowed the extradition to Israel of a German concentration
camp guard. The Court invoked universal jurisdiction, noting: "international law does not generally
prohibit the application of national laws over non citizens for acts committed outside its territory".
The Court noted that "Israel has brought charges ... asserting jurisdiction based on a statute that
penalizes "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity" among other acts. The international
community has determined that these offenses are crimes over which universal jurisdiction exists."
The Court quoted with approval the case of United States v. Otto, Case No. OOO-Mauthausen-5
(DJAWC, July 10, 1947), to the effect that "international law provides that certain offenses may be
prosecuted by any state because the offenders are common enemies of all mankind and all nations
have an equal interest in their apprehension and punishment"; Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. T., 83
AM. I. INT'L L. 334,341 (1999) noting a Denmark court trial of defendant in 1994 for war crimes
committed against Bosnians in the territory of the former Yugoslavia; Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d
232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995) where a U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals relied on universal
jurisdiction to assert jurisdiction in a tort case arising under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the
Torture Victim Protection Act against Radovan Karazic, the Bosnian Serb leader accused of crimes
against humanity and war crimes in Bosnia; United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.C. Cir.
1988), affd, 924 F.2d 1086 (C.A.D.C. 1991) - treaty-based jurisdiction over offenders found in their
territory, the court upheld the U.S. court's subject matter jurisdiction, based on the Hague
Convention and the Taking of Hostages Convention, that the victim's state of nationality may
exercise jurisdiction holding this to be consistent with customary international law, even when the
perpetrator was lured or brought into the territory of a State party. The U.S. exercised jurisdiction as
the state of nationality of two U.S. passengers who were among the victims of the alleged crime;
United States v. Layton, 519 F.Supp. 942 (N.D. Cal. 1981), affd, 855 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1988). The
U.S. exercised jurisdiction on the basis of being the state of the victim's nationality. This case
involved the murder of a U.S. congressman by a Guyanan citizen in Guyana - Internationally
Pmtected Persons Convention; U.S. v. Yousef, 927 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), where jurisdiction
was based on the Montreal Convention to try the defendants with various charges in connection with
alleged conspiracy to bomb United States commercial airliners operating overseas and roles in the
bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993; United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121 (D.C. Cir.
1998), the U.S. apprehended and prosecuted a Palestinian national for hijacking an Egyptian airliner,
despite the fact that Palestine is not a party to the Hague Hijacking Convention; United States v.
Wang Kun Lue, 134 F.3d 79,82 (2d. Cir. 1998) for attempted abduction of Chang Fung Chung on
April 24, 1992; United States v. Chen De Yian, 905 F.Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); United States v.
Chen De Yian, 1995 WL 614563 (S.D.N.Y.) - indictment alleging defendants and others conspired
to take Chan Fung Chung hostage in order to compel Chung's relatives to pay ransom to obtain
release from 1991 on or about April 24, 1992); United States v. Santos-Riviera, 183 F.3d 367, 368
(5 th Cir. 1999), charging that accused "knowingly and intentionally seize, detain, threaten to injure
and continue to detain Jocelyn Tehya Garrido in order to compel Ricardo Garrido and Maria Elliott
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that the Court's exercise of jurisdiction against nationals of non-party
states is overreaching, or that it is a violation of fundamental principles
of international law.
It should be noted that U.S. is not opposed to the Court's subject matter
jurisdiction, i.e. genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 79
Presently, any individual state may try perpetrators of these crimes under
the universal or territorial jurisdiction principle. so That state would not
need consent from another nation. 81 Thus, if individual states can
exercise universal jurisdiction over the same crimes contained in the ICC
Statute, there has not been any convincing legal argument to deny a
group of states joining together to set up a court that does the same thing.
Indeed, the Nuremberg tribunal set the precedent for this situation when
it stated: "[the Allied Powers] have done together what anyone of them
might have done singly; for it is not to be doubted that any nation has the
right thus to set up special courts to administer law."82
The reality is that the Rome Statute cut down on the ability of the Court
to exercise universal jurisdiction through the principle of
complementarity. Also, absent U.N. Security Council action, the court
must obtain the consent of either the state on whose territory a crime is
committed or the state of nationality of the accused. 83 Furthermore, the
UN Security Council has authority to halt prosecutions if in its opinion
such prosecution will not be compatible with its responsibilities under
Article VII of the UN Charter. 84 Therefore, the flawed argument by the
United States that the ICC should not exercise jurisdiction over nationals
of non-state parties is only an excuse to keep its nationals insulated from
the Court.
B.

POLITICALLY MOTIVATED PROSECUTION

Another of the U.S.'s grounds for opposing the ICC is that it could be
used by its enemies to initiate politically motivated prosecutions against
U.S. nationals. Article 15 of the ICC allows the ICC prosecutor to
Garrido to pay a cash ransom for therelease of Jocelyn Tehya Garrido, in violation of 18 U.S.c. §§
2, 1203 (2002).
79.
Scheffer, supra note 63, at 12-13.
80.
Paul Amell, International Criminal Law and Universal Jurisdiction, II INT'L LEGAL
PERSP. 53, 60-63 (1999). Also see Attorney-General of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 26
(Israel S.C!. 1962).
81.
Id. Also see, Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F. 2d 571, 582-583 (6'" Cir. 1985).
82.
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis and Establishing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945,
annex, 59 Stat. 1544,82 U.N.T.S. 279, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (Supp. 1945).
83.
ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 12.
84.
Id., art. 16.
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undertake investigations on his or her own initiative. 85 The U.S. was
concerned that the Office of the Independent Prosecutor might be used to
bring politically motivated prosecutions against U.S. soldiers. 86
It would appear that the U.S.'s objection to an independent Prosecutor
stems from its experience with the virtually unlimited investigative and
prosecutorial powers of the Office of U.S. Independent Prosecutor as
orchestrated by Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr during the Clinton
AdministrationY It was suggested by one anonymous U.S. official that
the United States feared that an independent ICC Prosecutor "would turn
out to be an 'international Ken Starr. "'88 As a result of the wide
discretionary powers of the U.S. independent prosecutor, there is now an
attempt in the United States to allow the independent counsel law to
lapse. 89 However, in the case of the ICC, this fear is unfounded because
of the various provisions in the statute to check the exercise of the
powers of the ICC Independent Prosecutor. These checks are discussed
below.
1.

Pre-Trial Panel

Article 15 of the statute provides that the prosecutor will exercise his/her
discretion subject to the supervision and approval of a three member pretrial panel of eminently qualified judges. 90 The judges will determine
whether there is a reasonable basis for the investigations. 91 The decision
of the pre-trial panel is subject to appeal.92
Even if it is admitted that the prosecutor's job will be influenced by
political considerations, the prosecutor's discretion must be guided by
the statute. Thus, even where the prosecutor concludes there is not
sufficient evidence to proceed, the pre-trial panel can review that
decision on request or on its own initiative. 93 Thus, in every situation,
the prosecutor is required to establish whether the ICC has jurisdiction in
85.
Id., art 15.
86.
Scheffer, supra note 63, at 19.
87.
Scott Andreasen, Note, The International Criminal Coun: Does the Constitution Preclude
Its Ratification by the United States?, 85 IOWA L. REV. 697, 723 (2000).
88.
Id., at n.198.
89.
28 U.S.C.A. §§ 591-599 (2002).
90.
ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 36(5). Also see, David Scheffer, U.N. International
Criminal Court, Statement Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate (July 23,
1998) available at 1998 WL 12762512 [hereinafter David Scheffer Testimony]. David Scheffer,
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues and Head of the U.S. Delegation to the UN Diplomatic
Conference on the Establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court, cited the "rigorous
qualifications for judges" as one of the U.S. objectives achieved at the Conference.
91.
ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 15(4).
92.
Id., art 18(4).
93.
Id., art. 53(3) (a) (b).
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the case; whether there is a reasonable prospect of conviction; and the
merit of the case. 94 Therefore, these legal hurdles will make it difficult
for political consideration to overshadow the prosecutor's decision on
which case to prosecute, and make it a priority on hislher part to
prosecute the most serious crimes.
2.

Security Council Intervention

Under Article 16 of the ICC Statute, the U.N. Security Council may by
unanimous vote delay a prosecution for twelve months if it believes the
ICC would interfere with the Council's efforts to further international
peace and security. Article 16 further allows the UN Security Council to
renew the request on the same grounds. In other words, the UN Security
Council may perpetually intervene to suspend a case before the ICC at
every twelve month interval on same grounds because Article 16 does
not limit the number of times the UN Security Council may request the
suspension of a case for security reasons. 95 This provision was a result of
a compromise suggestion by Singapore to placate the U.S. 96 As one of
the permanent members of the Security Council, it is plausible to suggest
that the United States stands in a better position to use this provision to
perpetually forestall the prosecution of a case concerning its nationals.
3.

The Principle of Complementarity

The principle of complementarity which permeates the ICC Statute
confers primacy on domestic courts over the ICC. In other words, the
Court's jurisdiction is complementary to domestic courts, and it can
exercise jurisdiction only when national criminal courts are not available
or are unable to perform.97 National sovereignty concerns informed the
introduction of the principle of complementarity in the operation of the
ICC. 98 Article 17 provides that the ICC will defer its jurisdiction to a
national court except in situations where national courts have been
genuinely unable or unwilling to investigate and/or prosecute the
accused. 99 Article 17 is applicable even when the state's leaders are

94.
95.

Id., art 53.
Id., art 16.

96.
John Washburn, The International Criminal Court Arrivers -- The U.S. Position: Status and
Prospects, 25 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 873, 878 (2002) citing Lionel Vee, The International Criminal
Court and the Security Council, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, THE MAKING OF THE
ROME STATUTE 143 (RoyS. Leeed., 1999).
97.
ICC Statute, supra note 3, pmbl., '1110.
98.
Article I of the Statute provides that the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for
the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be
complementary to national criminal jurisdiction.
99.
ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 17(a).
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themselves implicated. loo The prosecutor is duty-bound to notify all
states that might normally exercise jurisdiction of his or her intention to
continue with an investigation. 101 Thereupon, any state, whether a state
party or not, may then inform the Court that it is investigating the
situation domestically. 102 In such an event, the prosecutor must defer to
that investigation. 103
However, the pre-trial chamber can authorize an investigation by the
prosecutor if it determines that the state is unable or unwilling to
adequately carry out an effective investigation. I04 Such finding is subject
to challenge by the state. 105 The statute places the onus on the ICC
prosecutor to prove that a state is unable or unwilling to prosecute, or
that investigations and trials carried out by a state are fraudulent. 106
It has been suggested that a state may be unable to prosecute if it lacks
the required manpower and institutions to carry out a meaningful
criminal prosecution. I07 Such a situation could have arisen after the
genocide in Rwanda, where very few lawyers and judges survived the
1994 massacre. 108 On the other hand, a state may be unwilling to
prosecute a perpetrator if it demonstrates that it lacks the political will to
do so. This may occur where the accused is a member of the state
government, or exerts influence over or accepts favors from those in
government.
Article 17 was ostensibly drafted to accommodate and protect the United
States' interest. 109 Under the complementarity provision, the United
States may actually prevent the ICC from exercising jurisdiction over its
citizens by informing the Court of its willingness to investigate the
100.
101.

Id., art. 28.
Id., art. 18(1).
102.
Id., art 18(2) provides that within one month of receipt of notification, a state may inform
the Court that it is investigating or has investigated its nationals or others within its jurisdiction with
respect to criminal acts which may constitute crimes referred to in Article 5 and which relate to the
information provided in the notification to States. At the request of that State, the Prosecutor shall
defer to the State's investigation of those persons unless the Pre-Trial Chamber, on the application of
the Prosecutor, decides to authorize the investigation.
103.
Id.
104.
Id., art 19.
105.
Id., art 18(4). The State concerned or the Prosecutor may appeal to the Appeals Chamber
against a ruling of the Pre-Trial Chamber, in accordance to Article 82. Such appeal may be heard on
an expedited basis.
106.
Id., art. 17(2)(3).
107.
David Rider, Canadian Judge Pans New International Court: Arbour says Rules Shield
World's Worst Criminals, THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, Jan. 21, 2002, at A7 (quoting Justice Louise
Arbour of the Supreme Court of Canada and former ICTYIICTR prosecutor).
108.
Id.
109.
Scheffer, supra note 12, at 59-60.
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allegation under Article 18(2).110 In the event that the pre-trial chamber
rejects such request, Article 18(4) allows the requesting state to appeal an
adverse ruling of the pre-trial chamber to the appeals chamber. I II In
addition, under Article 18(7) a state which has challenged a ruling of the
pre-trial chamber may challenge the admissibility of the case under
Article 19 on grounds of additional significant facts or significant change
of circumstances. I 12 With these arrangements, the possibility that the
United States or any state party to the Rome Statute would not maintain
control over a case involving its citizen is exceedingly remote. I 13
In view of this possibility, cntlcs have suggested that the
complementarity provisions have watered down the jurisdiction of the
court, and worry that a state party may use the complementary provisions
to shield its nationals from the court's jurisdiction. 114 At a press
conference on June 12, 2001 then U.S. Secretary of Defense William
Cohen, while opposing the ICC, admitted that the Court's limited
authority would protect U.S. troops and officials. lIS He said that the U.S.
has "demonstrated over the years wherever there is an allegation of abuse
on the part ofa soldier we have a judicial system that will deal with it
very effectively."116 He correctly asserted that "as long as we have a
respected judicial system then there should be some insulation factor."117
Thus, this fact has not been lost on the U.S. government.

The United States has court-martialed its own soldiers in the past for
criminal activities, and there is no reason to believe it would not continue
to do so. Also, the United States' judicial system is well advanced and
can try almost all war crimes committed by U.S. nationals. In deserving
circumstances, the United States has enacted law requiring courts to hear
cases of nationals who have allegedly violated the law of nations as
contained in the ICC Statute. It is inconceivable that the U.S. will refuse
to try or at least investigate a U.S. solider accused of indictable war

110.

ICC Statute, supra note 3, art 18(2).

111.

/d., art 18(4).

112.
Id., art. 19(2) (b), provides that Challenges to the admissibility of a case under Article 17
or challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court may be made by a State which has jurisdiction over a
case, on the ground that it is investigating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted
the case.
113. Id.
114. Jimmy Gurule, United States Opposition to the 1998 Rome Statute Establishing an
International Criminal Coun: Is the Coun's Jurisdiction Truly Complementary to National
Criminal Jurisdictions?, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. I (2002).
liS.
See Human Rights Watch, Questions and Answers About the ICC, at
www.hrw.orglcampaigns/icc/qna.htm(last visited on Feb. 17,2003).
116.
Id.
117.
Id.
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crimes. Failure to do so would reflect adversely upon the credibility of
U.S. leadership, thus making it unlikely that it would take such a step.
With such an advanced judicial system and history of criminal
prosecution, it is difficult to imagine a situation where an investigation or
prosecution carried out by the U.S. will be' considered fraudulent.
Therefore, if the U.S. exercises jurisdiction over its nationals, the ICC
will be estopped from prosecuting its nationals under the principle of
complementarity. liS Thus, the international legal community is puzzled
over the U.S.' opposition to the ICC because of possible politically
motivated prosecution.
On the contrary, developing countries are less likely to benefit from the
complementarity provision as their legal systems and political climate
will be more unable or unwilling to undertake satisfactory and successful
prosecutions. As has been observed by Justice Arbour, "states with
relatively developed legal systems will have a 'major trump card' to
evade justice and will clash with developing countries that don't."119 She
posits that such a clash will be intensely political so that the ICC risks
becoming the true default jurisdiction for developing countries,
subjecting the court to major political legal battles with everyone else. 120
Therefore, developing countries should be the ones complaining of
politically motivated prosecution, not advanced democracies like the
U.S., whose legal system would easily satisfy the precondition for
exercising jurisdictional primacy as provided under the complementarity
principle.
However, an assessment that a government is unwilling to prosecute
should not be based on lack of action in a single case, but on a systematic
pattern of judicial inaction in pertinent cases. 121 Where a judicial system
is considered unable to conduct trials, the ICC should not concern itself
with assuming jurisdiction; rather the international community should
offer assistance and training to overcome any shortcomings. 122 In this
way, the ICC would retain the integrity of governments' judicial systems.
This is necessary, considering the fact that governments constitute the

118.
ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 20(3).
119.
Rider, supra note 107.
120.
Id.
121.
See Wilton Park Conference, Towards Global Justice: Accountability and the International
Criminal Coun (ICC), Feb. 4-8, 2002, at http://www.wiltonpark.org.uklweb/welcome.html (last
visited Feb. 17,2003).
122.
Id.
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Court's national partners, and their cooperation and compliance are
integral to its functioning. 123
4.

Nature of CrimelMental Element

The nature of the crimes for which the court will exercise jurisdiction
must be of such degree that they shock the conscience of nations. Thus,
the court will only exercise jurisdiction over horrific crimes of genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The evidentiary threshold of
establishing these crimes is enormous and the onus is on the independent
prosecutor to establish that the accused has committed crimes in the
degree provided in the statute.
a.

Genocide

For the crime of genocide, Article 5 of the Rome Statute adopted from
the 1948 Geneva Convention l24 provides that the accused must have
committed the crime with "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such, through killing
members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part,
imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, forcibly
transferring children of the group to another groUp."125
b.

Crimes Against Humanity

Article 7, which creates crimes against humanity, is a multilateral
codification of the Nuremberg Charter. 126 It is not, however, as broad as
customary international law because it limits the court's jurisdiction only
to the most serious crimes of international concern such as murder,
exterinination, and enslavement in peacetime or during war.127 Also
listed are crimes of sexual assault such as "rape, sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form
of sexual violence of comparable gravity."128 To be found guilty of
crimes against humanity, the statute requires that the accused commit
any of the listed acts "as part of a widespread or systematic attack

123.
124.
V.N.T.S.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,78
277, 280. The Vnited States is a party to this statute.
ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 6.
See Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 9.
ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 7.
Id., art. 7(1)(g).
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directed against any civilian population" and "pursuant to or in
furtherance of a state or organizational policy."129
In Prosecutor v. Akayesu, \30 the tribunal defined widespread as "massive,
frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively with considerable
seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims."'31 Systematic
was defined as "thoroughly organized and following a regular pattern on
the basis of a common policy involving substantial public or private
resources. "132
Therefore, for a U.S. service member to be found guilty of crimes against
humanity, the accused must have carried out any of the listed crimes
repeatedly against civilians and on the basis of a common public or
private organizational policy. It is hard to imagine a situation where the
U.S. would authorize and/or allow a U.S. service man or woman to
engage in any of the acts listed in Article 7 and in such magnitude as is
required to bring the act within the jurisdiction of the ICC. In other
words, isolated attacks carried out by a trigger-happy service member
without superior directive will not suffice. Thus, the U.S. concern for
politically motivated prosecution of its service members is difficult to
rationalize.
c.

War Crimes

Article 8, which provides for grave breaches of war crimes committed in
both international and internal armed conflicts, incorporates (with
narrower definitions and an exhaustive list) the four Geneva Conventions
of 1949, as well as, conventional and customary laws of war.\33 The
Court's jurisdiction attaches for war crimes in international armed
conflict only when "in particular" those crimes are "part of a plan or
policy or part of a large-scale commission of such crimes."I34 On the
other hand, for internal armed conflict, \35 the Court will exercise
jurisdiction only when "there is protracted armed conflict between

129. Id.
130.
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgments Int'l Criminal Trib. Rwanda
Trial Chamber I, at 1580 (Sept. 2, 1998).
131.
Id.
132.
Id. See ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 20(3).
133. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 8(2).
134.
Id., art. 8(1).
135.
Internal armed conflict includes organized armed opposition, or "freedom fighters,"
engaged in armed struggle within the territory of the state for either control of the government or
self-governance.
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governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groupS."136
United States nationals are unlikely to engage in internal armed conflict.
With regard to international armed conflict, Dr. Cherif Bassiouni, Chair
of the Drafting Committee at the ICC Conference, noted that a situation
in which war crimes charges were brought against U.S. military
personnel on peacekeeping missions would not hold up because the
statute defines war crimes as primarily acts committed "as part of a plan
or policy or as part of a large scale commission of such crimes."137
Therefore, he argued that "the trigger-happy Marine wouldn't fall under
that." I 38 Thus, a politically motivated prosecution of U.S. service
personnel would be difficult, if not impossible.
Even at that, Article 124 of the Rome Statute allows a state party to opt
out of the Court's jurisdiction for seven years after becoming a party to
the ICC Statute over war crimes committed on its territory or by its
nationals in internal armed conflict. \39 Article 124 was inserted in the
statute to accommodate the U.S.'s interest.
The United States'
representatives to the Rome Conference had sought a ten years "opt out"
from the court's jurisdiction over war crimes, but the conference agreed
only to a seven year opt-out period for war crimes. l40 Article 124
provides a compromise capable of "undermining the status of war crimes
as truly universal crimes [that might] result in a court with a fragmented
jurisdiction."'41 It has therefore been criticized as creating a loophole to
evade justice which is legally and morally unjustifiable. '42 The "opt out"
clause is an unwarranted restriction on the court's jurisdiction which will
severely hamper its effectiveness for years, if not decades."'43
These checks notwithstanding, the American government insisted that
the Rome statute must contain an ironclad guarantee that no American
would ever come before the Court.l44 Apart from the apparent inequality
of this request, its obvious implication is that a guarantee for America
136.
ld.
137. See James Podgers, War Crimes Court Under Fire, 1998 ABA JOURNAL 68 (Sept. 1998).
138. ld.
139. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 124. Article 124 provides that a state party to the ICC may
elect to exempt its nationals from the jurisdiction of the Court for a non-renewable period of seven
years from the date of ratification of the statute for war crimes.
140. See David Scheffer Testimony, supra note 90.
141.
Stanley, supra note 45.
142.
Kirsch, supra note 41, at 10.
143.
Je1ena Pejic, Senior Program coordinator at the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights in
New York City, cited in Podgers, supra note 137, at 68.
144.
See Thomas W. Lippman, America Avoids the Stand: Why the U.S. Objects to a World
Criminal Court, WASH. POST, July 26, 1998, at COl.
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would mean a de jure and de facto exemption of all other countries
which would effectively render the purpose of the Court moribund.
C.

INCLUSION OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION

The United States opposes the inclusion of the crime of aggression under
the court's jurisdiction. It insists on an affirmative determination by the
Security Council prior to bringing a complaint for aggression before the
Court. 145 The statute, however, provides that the Court cannot exercise
jurisdiction until the statute is amended to define aggression and
establish the conditions. l46 Such amendment "shall be consistent with the
relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations."147 Article 5(2)
of the Statute is intended to ensure that the Statute's definition of
aggression does not depart from Security Council duties under Article
VII of the UN Charter. The United States' objection to the inclusion of
the crime of aggression within the Court's jurisdiction is therefore
premature. A consensus on the definition of the meaning of aggression
is required, and may never happen in the near future. 148
D.

ABSENCE OF THE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL

Although the ICC statutory provisions for the protection of the right of
an accused very much duplicates the traditional constitutional protections
in the U.S. Bill of Rights, some have argued that the absence of the right
to jury trial is fatal to U.S. ratification of the ICC Statute. 149 The United
States argues that the ICC procedure does not include the right to speedy
trial and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. 150 This
argument is hardly correct, as the ICC contains adequate protections of
an accused's right to speedy trial and to cross-examine witnesses as
provided in Articles 59, 60, and 67. 151
Article 66( 1) of the statute contains the principle that all accused persons
shall be presumed innocent until proven gUilty before the ICC. Article
66(2) clearly provides that the prosecution bears the burden of proof
145. David Scheffer Testimony, supra note 90.
146. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 5(1 led).
147. Id., art. 5(2).
14S. The cold war era and the debate whether actions by non-state organs only may qualify as
aggression were some of the issues that had militated against an acceptable definition of aggression.
Some states oppose the inclusion of state action in the definition of aggression.
149. John Seguin, Note, Denouncing the International Criminal Coun: An Examination of u.s.
Objections to the Rome Statute, IS B.U. JNT'L LJ. S5, 107-OS (2000) quoting David Scheffer
Testimony, supra note 140.
150. Id. See also, Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal
Procedure in an International Context, 75 IND. L.J. S09, 812 (2000).
151.
ICC Statute, supra note 3.
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throughout the trial. To discharge this burden, Article 66(3) states that in
order to convict, the ICC must be convinced beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused is gUilty. Article 67(i) provides that the accused must
not bear "any reversal of the burden of proof or any onus of rebuttal,"
and Article 67(1)(g) expressly states that an accused has the right to
remain silent at trial without silence being a consideration in the
determination of guilt or innocence. Thus, the fundamental tenets of a
fair trial in any civilized state are adequately provided for in the statute. 152
It must be noted that the purpose of a jury system in the American justice
system is to ensure a fair trial. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court noted in
Palko V. Connecticut '53 that while the right to trial by jury is important, it
is "not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty."'54 The Court
opined that to abolish it is not to violate a "principle of justice so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental."'55 It is submitted that the ICC Statute contains sufficient
provisions that guarantee a fair trial to the accused. Therefore, the U.S.
should not be fixated on the requirement of a jury trial, but must be
amenable to any arrangement that contain substantial guarantee of
fairness to the accused. '56
Furthermore, the United States has allowed American citizens to be tried
abroad without a guarantee of American constitutional protections, or

152.
Human Rights Watch, lists the following rights, contained in the Rome Statute, as relevant
to guarantee a fair trial and treatment of an accused:
Rights not to incriminate oneself, not to be subject to any form of coercion, to
an interpreter, not to be subject to arbitrary arrest or detention, to be informed
of the grounds to believe he or she committed a crime, to remain silent, without silence being a consideration in guilt or innocence, to legal assistance, to
have counsel present during questioning, to be heard before charges are confirmed, to be informed of the evidence on which the prosecutor intends to rely
at the confirination hearing, to be present at triaL Similarly, defendants have
their fundamental rights guaranteed, including the right to be informed
promptly and in detail of the charges, to have full time and facilities for the
preparation of one's defense and free communication with counsel, to trial
without delay, to cross examine witnesses and obtain attendance of witnesses,
not to incriminate oneself, to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, to have evidence disclosed which shows or mitigates the
guilt of the accused or affects the credibility of prosecution evidence. See
Myths and Facts· About the International Criminal Court, at
www.hrw.orglcampaignslicc/facts.htm (last visited Feb. 18,-2003).
153.
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
154. /d. at 325.
155. Id.
156. For further discussions see, Diane Holcombe, The United States Becomes a Signatory to
the Rome Treaty Establishing the International Criminal Court: Why Are So Many Concerned By
This Action, 62 MONT. L. REV. 301,329-335 (2001).
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specifically, a jury trial. J57 "In other words, merely because an offense
occurred in the United States involving an American national, extradition
of that individual does not violate the United States Constitution."158 This
is usually the case when the U.S. accedes to extradition requests from
countries that have bilateral extradition treaties with the U.S. In Neely v.
Henkel,159 Justice Harlan of the U.S. Supreme Court opined that:
When an American citizen commits a crime in a foreign
country, he cannot complain if required to submit to
such modes of trial and to such punishment as the laws
of that country may prescribe for its own people, unless
a different mode be provided for by treaty stipulations
between that country and the United States. l60
However, those who object to United States ratification of the ICC
Statute have argued that Neely applies only in situations where the
crimes were either committed abroad, or were intended to achieve
criminal consequences abroad. 161 Even accepting this construction of the
Neely decision, it should be pointed out that so far the U.S. has indicated
concern over the trial of its servicemen for crimes committed while on
peacekeeping operations abroad. Therefore, the war crimes would have
been committed by Americans in a foreign territory which would have
effect in a foreign country, thereby making the decision in Neely
applicable.
In addition, it must be recalled that in United States v. Melia,162 the court
upheld extradition of a U.S. citizen to Canada for conspiring by
telephone from Connecticut with persons in Canada to commit a murder
in the United States. 163 Also, in Austin v. Healy,l64 the Court upheld
extradition of U.S. citizen to the U.K. for conspiring from New York to
arrange a murder in the D.K.165 Similarly, in Valencia v. Scott,166 the
157.
Id. at 335 (citing Melia v. United States, 667 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981) (accused extradited
for crimes committed in U.S. with intended criminal effects in another country)). In United States v.
Melia, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that although the accused never entered Canada to
conspire or commit the murder, his telephone calls to Canada were enough to allow his extradition to
Canada to stand trial.
158.
Holcombe, supra note 156, at 335.
159.
Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
160. Id.
161.
Robert Christensen, Getting to Peace by Reconciling Notions of Justice: The Importance of
Considering Discrepancies Between Civil and Common Legal Systems in the Formation of the
International Criminal Court, 6 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFr. 391,419 (2002).
162.
Melia v. United States, 667 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
163.
Id.
164.
Austin v. Healy, 5 F.3d 598 (2d cir. 1993).
165.
Id.
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court upheld extradition of U.S. citizens to France for conspiracy to
export cocaine from New York to France. 167 Therefore, trying U.S.
nationals before the ICC without the participation of a jury would be
neither unique nor unconstitutional.
IV. AFFIRMATIVE STEPS TAKEN BY THE U.S. TO UNDERMINE
THE ICC
Since the ICC Statute took effect, the United States has taken several
steps to continue its opposition to the court and to try to prevent the court
from exercising jurisdiction over U.S. nationals. Some of these steps are
discussed below.
A.

UN-SIGNING OF THE STATUTE

On May 6, 2002, the Bush administration formally notified the
Secretary-General of the United Nations that the United States would not
become a party to the International Criminal Court statute. 168 By virtue
of section 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,169 the
effect of this unusual act is that the U.S. government, having made clear
its intention not to become a party to the ICC Statute, is relieved of its
obligations as a signatory state to the ICC to refrain from acts which
would defeat the object and purpose of the ICC Statute. 170 Beyond this,
however, the United States' signature will remain on the original of the
statute in the custody of the Secretary-General, and it could still be
followed by U.S. ratification of the ICC Statute anytime the U.S. is
predisposed to become a state party.I71
B.

AMERICAN SERVICE-MEMBERS' PROTECTION ACT OF 2002

In December 2001, Congress passed the American Service-members'

Protection Act (ASPA) which in part bans the U.S. from cooperating
with the court in any way, and permits the president to use "all means
necessary" to free American citizens if they are detained for or on behalf
166.
Galen Valencia V. Scott, 1992 WL 75036 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
167. Id.
168. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 4, at n.6.
169.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 18, U.N. Doc.
NCONF.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 543 (1969). Article 18 provides that "a State is
obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when it has signed
the treaty [... ) until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party thereto."
170.
See Jacques Roman, Treaty Signatures Can't be Withdrawn, BANGKOK POST, May 11,
2002, available at 2002 WL 18165663. See, however, ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 127, which
provides that withdrawal will take effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification, unless
notification specifies a later date.
ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 126(2).
171.
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of the court and to block extradition of U.S. nationals accused of war
crimes to the court. 172
However, before Congress went on its 2001 annual recess, it decided not
to submit the ASPA for the president's signature, but the Defense
Appropriations bill adopted by Congress for the Fiscal Year 2002
contains a provision adopted by the House which prohibits the use of
FY2002 funds to cooperate with the Court. 173 This provision was offered
by House International Relations Committee Chairman Henry Hyde (Rll).174
A similar amendment offered by Senator Larry Craig (R-Id)
applying to the FY2002 budgets for the State, Commerce, and Justice
Departments, was approved by Congress in November and has been
signed into law by President Bush. '75
The effects of these bills were merely symbolic, as there was little
likelihood that any country would be called upon to make financial
contributions to the Court during the fiscal year covered by the bills.
However, the actions taken by the United States Congress and President
Bush is significant because it clearly sent the message that the Bush
administration does not intend to support the ICC.
The final version of the ASP A was signed into law on August 03, 2002,
by President Bush. 176 The ASPA authorizes the president "to use all
means necessary and appropriate to bring about the release" of any
American or citizen of a United States ally being held by the ICC and to
provide legal assistance for such persons. 177 The ASPA also provides for
the withdrawal of U.S. military assistance from countries ratifying the
ICC, and allows for U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions to
be contingent upon immunity.178
The President may, however, waive this provision on "national interest"
grounds. 179 In essence, the Act gives the administration discretion to
override the ASPA's effects on a case-by-case basis. But, as Richard
Dicker observed, the U.S. government "may try to use this to strong-arm

172. See Conferees Drop ASPA from FY2002 Defense Appropriations Bill; Retain Hyde
Provision Precluding Assistance to ICC (Jan. 9, 2002) at www.unausa.orglnewindex.asp.
173.
[d.
174.
175.

[d.
[d.

176. Dicker, supra note 19.
177. American Service-members' Protection Act of 2002, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7432 (2002)
[hereinafter ASPAj.
178.
[d., §§ 2005, 2007.
179.
[d., § 2003.
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additional concessions from the states that support the court."180 Dicker
therefore urged states supporting the ICC "not to fall into the U.S. trap,"
noting that ASPA does not require any punitive measures: 81
C.

BILATERAL ICC IMMUNITY DEALS

In July 2002, the Bush administration sought permanent immunity from
the court, but obtained a one-year deferral from the Security Council of
ICC's jurisdiction over U.S. service members on peacekeeping
operations: 82 Although the UN Security Council granted the U.S. only
one year, it is likely that the one-year deferral will be renewed again.183
The Security Council should, however, be mindful of creating a
precedent that may be latched onto by other states to demand similar
exemptions in the future.

After obtaining a one-year deferral, the U.S. is now trying, on a countryby-country basis, to get countries (especially those that have American
troops stationed in their territory) to sign bilateral ICC immunity deals,
arguably under Article 98 of the ICC Statute. U.S. State Department
officials confirm that the Bush administration has asked U.S. embassies
around the world to approach host governments about negotiating such
Yugoslavia and Norway
bilateral agreements with the U.S: 84
government officials have confirmed that their governments have been
approached by the U.S. to sign an ICC immunity agreements. 185
The ICC immunity agreement is an undertaking by both countries not to
extradite each other's citizens to the International Criminal Court without
mutual consent. The Bush administration has threatened ICC state
parties with withdrawal of military aid, including education, training, and
financing the purchases of equipment and weaponry, if they fail to
protect Americans serving in their countries from ICC reach. 186

180.
Dicker, supra note 19.
181. Id.
182.
S.c. Res. 1422, U.N. SCOR, 45720d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES11422 (2002), available at
http://www.un.org!Docs/Scres/2002Jsc2002.htm.
183. ICC Statute, supra note 3, art. 16, allows the Security Council to defer an investigation or
prosecution by the Courts for periods of one year, renewable annually, if the Council decides that
such deferral is in the interest of international peace and security.
184.
U.S. Dept. of State Daily Press Briefing, Philip T. Reeker, Deputy Spokesman (Aug. 8,
2002) available at http://www.diplomacy.orglartOO20.html.
185.
U.S. Asks Yugoslavia to Sign Non-Extradition Pact for ICC Court Cases, Assoc. PREss
WORLDSTREAM, Aug. 8, 2002, available at http://www.iccnow.orglhtmllpressart98db20020924.pdf
(on file with author). See also, USA Asks Norway to Sign Non-Extradition Pact on Hague Court,
AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Aug. 8,2002, (Int'I News), available at LEXIS, News Library, AFP File.
186.
Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Ties Military Aid to Peacekeepers' Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10,
2002, at AI.
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Since July 2002, when the ICC Statute came into effect, the United
States has signed immunity deals with 18 countries, including,
Afghanistan, Djibouti, the Dominican Republic, East Timor, EI Salvador,
Gambia, Honduras, India, Israel, the Marshall Islands, Mauritania,
Micronesia, Nepal, Palau, Romania, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan. 187 Although the European Union had initially resisted the
United States' request for a so-called Article 98 bilateral agreement,188
the 15 member EU governments agreed to prevent the extradition of
American government employees accused of war crimes to the Court. 189
The only' condition is that the United States government guarantees that
such a suspect would be tried in an American court. The immediate
effect of this decision is that any European Union nation is now free to
sign a separate bilateral agreement with the United States over the
Court. 190
The conclusion of a bilateral agreement between ICC state parties and
the United States is objectionable, as it contradicts the customary
international law principle of pacta sunt servanda, which obligates a
state party not to do anything that will undermine its treaty obligations. 191
State parties to the ICC agreed in Article 88 to "ensure that there are
procedures available under their national law for all forms of
cooperation" listed in Part 9 of the Rome Statute. In addition, Article
59(1) requires state parties to comply immediately with requests by the
ICC to arrest and surrender accused persons in their territories.
State parties to the ICC have an affirmative duty to assist in locating and
extraditing an accused within its territories. Therefore, these state parties
should be concluding agreements that will expedite this obligation under
Article 59(1) of the Rome Statute. However, the essence of a bilateral
treaty with the United States is to insulate U.S. nationals from the
jurisdiction of the ICC, which will directly affect the ability of the Court
to prosecute those accused of committing international crimes. The ICC
was created to ensure that anyone, no matter what his or her position,
who commits an international crime is held accountable for his or her
actions. The existence of bilateral immunity deals excluding citizens of
187.
U.S. Seals 18th ICC Immunity Deal as Djibouti Agrees to Pact, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Jan.
24,2003, (General News), available at LEXIS, News Library, AFP File.
188.
EU Concerned Over Romanian Deal With United States on Immunity From International
Aug. 8, 2002, available at
Criminal Court, ASSOCIATED PRESS WORLDSTREAM,
http://www.derechos.orgjnizkor/icdeuromania.html.
189. Paul Meller, Europeans to Exempt U.S. From War Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,2002, at A6.
190.
Id.
191.
Among the states that have signed bilateral agreements with the United States.
Afghanistan, Djibouti, East Timor, Gambia, Honduras, the Marshall Islands, Romania, and
Tajikistan have ratified the Rome Statute.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2003

33

Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 9 [2003], Iss. 1, Art. 3

52

ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT'L & COMPo LAW

[Vol. 9:1

certain countries from the ICC gives the impression of a license to kill.
This kind of accommodation will make the court partial to non-party
states such as the United States.
V.

CONCLUSION

Most U.S. objections to the ICC are unfounded, premature, and
speculative, and do not justify its refusal to ratify the Rome Statute. As
demonstrated, the U.S. seems to equate ICC jurisdiction over nationals of
a state to mean the same thing as jurisdiction over the United States as a
country. This grave misconstruction of the law is regrettable as it does
not operate from ignorance of the law but from a deliberate distortion of
international law .
While Americans are worried that the ICC may become a tool in the
hands of its enemies to prosecute United States servicemen deployed for
peacekeeping operations, advocates of the ICC see it as an institution that
will help save the lives of American soldiers. It is envisaged that the
Court will serve as an avenue to promote international justice and
individual accountability. Thus, the ICC will deter gross human rights
violators by confronting them with the threat of punishment. In this way,
the ICC will help to put a stop to future "ethnic cleansing" as occurred in
Bosnia and Rwanda.
Therefore, if the U.S. supports and strengthens the Court, it will no
longer be necessary to put American servicemen's lives in danger by
deploying them to such war-tom areas. Today, American soldiers in
Bosnia and indeed allover the world are safer because the leading
Bosnian Serb racists and their like in the former Republic of Yugoslavia
are either in hiding or in prison, instead of inciting their followers to
violence against U.S. peacekeepers.\92
Most of the delegates at the ICC Conference were concerned that efforts
to accommodate the United States demands may provide loopholes for
the Pol Pots, Saddam Husseins, and Milosevices of tomorrow. 193 The
general feeling of most of the nations at the Rome Conference, as
expressed by Adriaan Bos,194 is that delegates have gone far enough to
placate the U.S .. According to Mr. Bos, "efforts to reach compromises

192.
Jerry Fowler, U.S. Has Wounded International Justice, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 10,1998, at A21.
193.
Kirsch, supra note 41, at 11.
194.
Mr. Adriaan Bos, a Dutch Diplomat, was supposed to be the Chair of the Conference's
primary deliberative body, the Committee of the Whole, but was diagnosed as having cancer weeks
before the conference started and replaced by Canadian Phillippe Kirsch.
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have been used to the maximum."'95 He cautioned that "we cannot let
ourselves. destroy the essentials of an International Criminal Court ... a
new institution that gives hope to the entire world that we can hope to
bring to justice those who transgress the most basic human principles."'96
A similar view was expressed in Professor Bassiouni's suggestion that
the United States got most of what it wanted "within the folds of the
agreement," if not explicitly.'97 He opined that U.S. officials did not get
what they may really have been after, "a stamp across the front of the
treaty that says this will never apply to the United States, but the United
States can use it whenever it wants."198 Considering that most of the
U.S.' objections are unfounded, this author cannot but agree with this
view. Also, in an opinion piece published in the Washington Post, U.N.
Secretary-General Dr. Kofi Annan noted that all signatories to
international accords agree to assume similar risks. '99 He proffered that
the contradiction in U.S. foreign policy2°O stems from the American
attitude that says, "one law for us, another for everybody else."20'
It would therefore appear that the U.S. prefers to stand outside a

collective framework of international law to pursue its policies without
hindrance by the rule of law which the majority of other democratic
nations have accepted, and which it had introduced to others. The United
States played a prominent role in the promulgation and enforcement of
the Nuremberg principles, and it continues to play a significant role in
the ad hoc tribunals in Rwanda and the former Republic of Yugoslavia.
Therefore, for the U.S. to turn around and antagonize the ICC because it
seeks jurisdiction over U.S. citizens is hypocritical.
As eloquently opined by Justice Jackson, U.S. chief prosecutor for the
Allies in the Nuremberg trials, if certain offenses are crimes, "they are
crimes whether the United States does them or whether Germany does
them, and we are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct
against others which we would be unwilling to have invoked against
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John Hooper, U.S. Plan to Thwart War Crimes Court,

196.

[d.

197.

Podgers, supra note 137, at 69.

198.

[d.

GUARDIAN WEEKLY,

July 26, 1998.

199. William Raspberry, Reflections in a Gentle Mirror, WASH. POST, Aug. 12,2002 at A15.
200. For example, America's tendency to reach out internationally when it suits its purposes (as
in the fight against terrorism - "Operation Enduring Freedom"), but to assume a go-it-alone posture
when international cooperation seems inconvenient (as in U.S. baseless opposition to the ICC).
201.
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US."202 He then declared that: "While the law is first applied against
German aggressors, the law includes, and if it is to serve any useful
purpose it must condemn aggression by any other nations, including
those who sit here now injudgment.''203
The United States cannot aspire to world leadership without holding the
high moral ground. The assumption that its military and economic might
are sufficient to lead the rest of the world amounts to naIve political
computation. If there is any lesson to be learned from the events of 9/11
and its aftermath, it is that a unilateral superpower structure cannot
succeed in today's world. Rather than alienate itself from the ICC, the
U.S. should team up with the rest of the world to enable the Court to
proceed effectively, and assist in every way possible to bestow the
strength and credibility required by the Court to achieve its objectives.
The United States should rise to its responsibility as a country that
cherishes freedom by cooperating with a system that will serve the
profound needs of the international community to stigmatize criminal
regimes and their policies in order to further the goals of international
justice and morality.

202. Christopher J. McGrath, Today's Transnational Crime Epidemic: The Necessity of an
International Criminal Coun to Battle Misdeeds Which Transcend National Borders, 6 1. INT'L &
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